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I
THEME
"The First Amendment' has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."2
Despite Justice Hugo Black's assertion, the Supreme Court itself has recognized
that some church-state contacts are necessary and inevitable. 3 This has created
"considerable internal inconsistency" within the law, as the Supreme Court has
"struggled" to develop an effective standard for judging church-state contacts.4
One of the most recent standards used by the Supreme Court in applying the
First Amendment religion clauses to church-state contacts is the so-called "excessive
entanglement" test that it first mentioned in Walz v. Tax Commission3 and more
fully explained in Lemon v. Kurtzman.6 Although "[s]ome members of the Court
have criticized the anti-entanglement requirement as a superfluous statement of
the secular effect rule,"7 close scrutiny reveals a potentially useful tool for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of government contacts with religious bodies. The current
test is not immune from all criticism, however, as it has created considerable
confusion in the lower courts. 8 The ever-increasing array of conflicting lower court
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1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. Const., Amend. I. The First Amendment is often divided into two religion
clauses: the "Establishment Clause" and the "Free Exercise Clause."
2. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
4. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). Even the metaphorical "high and impregna-
ble" wall between church and state is in reality "a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular [church-state] relationship." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971).
5. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12 at 865 (1978). In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977), five Justices in two separate opinions expressed various reservations concerning the test. 433
U.S. at 255 (White & Rehnquist, JJ. separate opinion); 433 U.S. at 255-62, 64-66 (Brennan, Marshall &
Stevens, JJ.).
8. See text and notes at notes 25-71, infra.
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decisions evidences both "the chaotic state of legal theory in this area of constitu-
tional law" 9 and the need for a more explicit and carefully formulated test.
The entanglement doctrine should identify government contacts with religious
organizations that further or impair religion by directing or influencing religious
matters.' 0 Such identification is important since "both religion and government can
best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere."'' To this end, we propose a reformulated entanglement test
that focuses on three factors: (1) the religious character of the activity involved in
the contacts, (2) the frequency and effect of the contacts, and (3) the government
interest served. This factor analysis is meant to direct courts to the functional issues
in church-state contacts and help them determine whether such contacts impermis-
sibly direct or influence religious activity.
To present the proposed factor analysis, this article first reviews the Supreme
Court cases creating the entanglement test and some of the lower court cases
explaining and applying the test. Discussion of the proposed test follows in order to
demonstrate its usefulness in distinguishing permissible from impermissible church-
state contacts. The article closes by applying the reformulated entanglement test to
the lower court cases in an effort to reconcile the conflicting and confusing array of
decisions.
lI
THE ENGANGLEMENT TEST IN THE CASE LAW
A. Supreme Court Cases
The use of an entanglement test to determine the validity of a statute requiring
a church-state relationship first surfaced in Walz v. Tax Commission. 12 In that case, a
taxpayer challenged the New York City Tax Commission's grant of property tax
exemptions to various church properties, claiming that the tax exemption on
church property forced him to contribute indirectly to religious bodies, in violation
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. After discussing the First Amend-
ment principles at length, the Supreme Court effectively summarized "[t]he gen-
eral principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by
the Court" on the religion clauses by declaring that it could "not tolerate either
governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion."'1 3
To avoid governmentally established religion, the Court suggested the need to
examine whether the purpose of a statute is to sponsor or support religion. But
such an examination "does not end the inquiry," according to the Court, as a
statute may also violate the First Amendment by an effect, i.e., interfering with
9. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 E Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1978).
10. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 634 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
12. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
13. Id., at 669.
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religion.' 4 Thus, the Court added a second step to its analysis: "[wie must also be
sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion."'1 5 Without elaborating on what constitutes "excessive government
entanglement," the Court simply found that there was "no genuine nexus between
tax exemption and establishment of religion" and held that the tax exemption did
not violate the First Amendment.'
6
One year after the Walz decision, the Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
17
used the excessive entanglement doctrine to strike down, as unconstitutional, state
statutes providing various forms of aid to church-related elementary and secondary
schools. Excessive entanglement, however, was just one part of a three-prong test
suggested by the Court. Under the three-prong test, a statute must (1) have a
secular legislative purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither promotes nor
inhibits religion, and (3) not result in excessive entanglement. Failure to comply
with any one aspect of the three-part test, according to the Court, will render a
statute unconstitutional.
The Court suggested that the determination of whether government interaction
with religious bodies constitutes excessive entanglement requires an examination of
three factors: first, "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited";
second, "the nature of the aid that the State provides"; and third, "the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority."' 8 Applying this
analysis, the Court concluded that "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the statutes in [question] involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion."'1
9
The Court recognized in Lemon that entanglement scrutiny was ultimately an
ad hoc determination based "on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. 2 °
14. Id., at 674.
15. Id.
16. Id., at 675, 680. However, the Court did make it clear that the taxation of religious institutions
would necessarily require more entanglement than tax exemption. Id., at 674-676.
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18. Id., at 615.
19. Id., at 614 (emphasis added). The entanglement test enunciated in Lemon is aimed at two
separate evils: the evil of administrative entanglement, id., at 615 (citing Harlan's concurring opinion in
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970), and the evil of political divisiveness, 403 U.S. at 622.
See Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis L.J. 205, 211 (1980). Administrative entanglement-where the state
monitors or becomes involved in a religiously related activity-may lead to the invalidation of a
relationship because such monitoring or involvement necessarily "creates an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state." 403 U.S. at 622. Political divisiveness is a second ground for
invalidating and prohibiting a given relationship between church and state under the Lemon test
because, as Chief Justice Burger has declared, "political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id., at 622. The Chief
Justice's assertion, however, appears to be lacking in historical accuracy. Gaffney, supra at 212-24. The
Court has been called upon to abandon the political divisiveness doctrine because it is based on
historical inaccuracy and bad public policy. ("It is time for the Court to abandon the political divisiveness
test because the test is dysfunctional, illiberal, theologically unsound, constitutionally impermissible, and
historically erroneous.") Gaffney, supra at 236 and passim.
The statutes at issue in Lemon and the Court's treatment of the statutes are more fully explained in
the text and notes at notes 15-112 infra.
20. 403 U.S. at 614.
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The "substance" of the relationship, the Court pointed out, is crucial, with "form"
only incidental:
This is not to suggest . . . that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet in which
precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form and
style, the observance of which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine the
form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance. 2 1
We believe that the reformulated test accomplishes this task, while the Lemon test
as applied has not.
The Supreme Court's entanglement test, as developed in Lemon, apparently
arose because the Court fears that any amount of entanglement--or more neutral-
ly, contacts-between government and a religious organization is constitutionally
suspect. 22 The Court's apparent concern for the frequency of church-state contacts
is appropriate since the frequency of actual, proposed, and threatened contacts is
rapidly increasing. However, all of these contacts are not identical in nature; some
are neutral, others hostile, still others benevolent, and so on. Additionally, the
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that "[s]ome relationship between govern-
ment and religious organizations is inevitable. 2 3 In Lemon the Court admitted that
its earlier holdings did "not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. '"24 When viewed in this light, the
Lemon entanglement test, with its apparent concern over the quantity of church-
state entanglement, is virtually meaningless because it fails to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible contacts. Such a distinction is crucial since total
separation is impossible. The ineffectiveness of the current entanglement test is
evidenced by the uncertainty and confusion the test has created in the lower courts.
B. Lower Court Cases
If recitation by lower courts proves the value of a legal rule, then the entangle-
ment test, as enunciated in Lemon, is priceless. The test has become almost like
holy writ: ceremoniously invoked and fervently quoted, but seldom criticized.
Nearly every court which has considered cases even remotely related to potential
21. Id.
22. In Lemon the Supreme Court spoke in terms of "comprehensive" and "enduring" entangle-
ments:
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required
to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected.
Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of
his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church.
403 U.S. at 619. Furthermore, the Court states that Walz calls for "close scrutiny of the degree of
entanglement involved in the relationship." Id., at 614. "The objective [of the entanglement scrutiny] is
to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other." Id.
The opinion appears to suggest that in terms of church-state entanglements, "fewer" is better and
"many" is automatically suspect. See also the cases cited in note 33, infra.
23. 403 U.S. at 614.
24. Id.
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entanglement has quoted the Lemon test verbatim. 25 While the lower courts have
had little difficulty in quoting the Lemon test consistently, they have had increas-
ingly more difficulty in explaining and applying it consistently to particular fact
situations. Even more fundamental, the lower court opinions evidence an uncer-
tainty as to when to use the entanglement test.
26
In attempting to apply the entanglement test, the lower courts have considered
a wide variety of factors. 27 Although Lemon requires a broad evaluation, it has
resulted in lower court holdings that are nearly as variable as the facts being
considered. Indeed, the holdings of the lower courts appear so inherently inconsis-
tent that opponents of the entanglement test have pointed out that the test is "not
a test at all but a standardless mask disguising the real reasons why federal judges
nullify controversial legislation."
28
The confusion and inconsistencies within the lower courts center around the
question of what types of contacts between church and state constitute entangle-
ment. While one federal district court has suggested that "purely clerical" contacts
between church and state are acceptable, 29 another has held that excessive entan-
glement may result from the "mere inquiry" by the state "into the employment
practices of an institution that comprises the very heart of religious propagation [a
seminary]. 3 ° Yet a third federal district court compromised the two extremes by
holding that court-supervised inquiries and contacts are permissible because courts
can "restrain overly zealous" inquirers seeking extensive trial discovery.
3 1
The lower courts are also uncertain about how to apply the Supreme Court's
apparent concern over frequent and continuing entanglement.32 Some federal
courts treat the number of contacts required in a given church-state relationship
almost as if the sheer quantity of contacts presumptively satisfies the entanglement
test.33 Other courts note that even a minimal number of contacts will violate the
First Amendment if they inhibit the free exercise of religion; those courts carefully
25. See, e.g., American Motors Corp. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 93 Wis.2d
14, 286 N.W.2d 847, 854 (1979); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1242 (Alaska 1979).
26. Compare Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 E Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978) (no
violation of Establishment Clause) with Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg, 479 F Supp.
1364 (D.R.I. 1979), affd, 630 E2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980) (violation of Establishment Clause); see text and
notes at notes 36-49, infra.
27. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 79-2786 (Slip Opinion, 3rd Cir. Dec. 30, 1980);
Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference, 21 FEP Cases 846, 848 (C.D. Cal. 1977); EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 485 E Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
28. Gaffney, supra note 19, at 211.
29. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F Supp. 1113, 1119 (S.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 444 U.S. 801 (1979).
30. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 144, 485 E Supp. 255 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
31. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Assn., 482 F Supp. 1291, 1311 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
32. See note 22, supra.
33. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 79-2786 (Slip Opinion, 3rd Cir. Dec. 30, 1980)
(entanglement resulting from numerous planning sessions involving church and governmental officials);
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978) (The amount and nature
of contacts required by the statute at issue compared with the statutes in Supreme Court cases to
determine if more or less entanglement was involved).
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analyze the qualitative nature of church-state contacts. 4 Still another court suggests
that even an analysis of both the frequency and the nature of the church-state
contacts is insufficient. This court argues that courts must also consider the nature
of the religious institution involved in the government contact because "[t]he risk of
unseemly governmental entanglement increases exponentially as the function of an
institution becomes more fundamentally and pervasively religious.
3 5
Because of the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the entanglement test,
lower courts have abandoned attempts to decide cases by applying defined stan-
dards in favor of simple case-by-case fact comparison. As a result, they decide new
questions which arise under the religion clauses by the degree of similarity to
previously decided Supreme Court cases. As one court, troubled by the lack of
"discernible consistency" in Establishment Clause cases, explained, the "emphasis
on case as opposed to doctrinal analysis may seem somewhat simplistic, but due to
the chaotic state of legal theory in this area of constitutional law, the court sees no
other mode of examination which can reliably foretell the probable view of the
Supreme Court. '36 This case-by-case fact comparison works when cases are factually
similar to previously decided Supreme Court cases, but when new and different
factual problems appear, the approach becomes difficult.
37
The uncertainty in the lower courts about the entanglement test naturally has
produced diverse and often irreconcilable results. Results coincide in cases dealing
with issues that the Supreme Court has already expressly addressed, such as the
validity of property tax exemptions for religious bodies. 3 8 However, results diverge
in cases that are dissimilar to the decided Supreme Court cases, such as the
permissible extent of jurisdiction of various government agencies over religious
bodies. 3 9 A review of some of the recent lower court decisions will illustrate this fact.
1. Tax Exemption and Deduction Cases. While courts agree that tax exemptions
on religious property and income are constitutional,40 they often disagree on the
34. See Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference, 21 FEP Cases 846 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The argument
advanced by the court that even a small amount of contacts may violate the First Amendment is surely
correct, for even a minimal amount of contacts may direct or influence religious activity. See text and
notes at notes 95-104, infra.
35. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 144, 485 F Supp. 255, 260
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
36. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1978).
37. Compare NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School, 623 E2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980)
Petition for cert. filed sub nom. Lay Faculty Ass'n, Local 1261 v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School,
49 U.S.L.W 3496 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1069) (following NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979)) and Filler v. Port Washington Union Free School District, 436 F Supp. 1231 (E.D.
N.Y. 1977) (following Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)) with EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F2d
477 (5th Cir. 1980) vacating 451 F Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1978) and Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,
604 E2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) rev'g 460 F Supp. 121 (D.P.R. 1978).
38. See note 40, infra.
39. See text and notes at notes 58-70, infra.
40. The Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission to uphold and allow state (New York)
property tax exemptions to religious organizations for buildings used for public worship has virtually
eliminated any doubts as to the constitutionality of religious tax exemptions. The practice of granting
tax exemptions for religious bodies has over 200 years of American history and tradition in its favor and
is unquestionably the accepted and usual practice today as "[alll of the 50 states provide for tax
exemption of places of worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees." 397 U.S. at 676.
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constitutionality of other types of favorable tax treatment for religious institutions.4 '
Two federal district court actions challenging state income tax deductions for
school expenses exemplify the disparities in lower court holdings. In both Minne-
sota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer 42 and Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v.
Norberg,4 3 it was argued that the parents' deductions of their dependents' school
tuition, transportation, and textbooks under state tax deduction statutes violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments 44 to the United States Constitution because
such statutes primarily benefited parents whose children attended sectarian schools.4 5
Even though the challenged statutes were identical4 6 and the two district courts
41. See e.g., Public Funds for Public Schools v. Byrne, 444 E Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 590
E2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1979) (striking down N.J. statute granting deduction to parents of nonpublic
schoolchildren); text and notes at notes 42-49 infra.
42. 452 E Supp. 1316 (D.Minn. 1978).
43. 479 F Supp. 1364 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 630 E2d 855 (Ist Cir. 1980).
44. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
45. Since the tax deduction was for expenditures on tuition, textbooks, and transportation, it would
only benefit those parents whose dependents paid tuition and the other expenses. Since most students
in public school pay no tuition and are furnished textbooks and transportation, the deduction essentially
benefited only those parents with dependents in nonpublic schools-and nearly all of the nonpublic
schools were sectarian. In Rhode Island, for example, it was found that "93.4% of the children
attending school . . . whose parents are eligible for the challenged tuition deductions attend sectarian
schools." 479 E Supp. at 1366.
46. The two state statutes in question were virtually identical. The Rhode Island statute, R.I.G.L. §
44-30-12(c)(2), provided:
(c) Modifications Reducing Federal Adjusted Gross Income-There shall be subtracted
from federal adjusted gross income . . . (2) amounts paid to others, not to exceed five
hundred ($500) dollars for each dependent in kindergarten through sixth grade and seven
hundred ($700) dollars for each dependent in grades seven through twelve inclusive, for
tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each dependent attending an elementary or second-
ary school situated in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire,
or Maine, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance
laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. As used in this section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and other
instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching
only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools
in this state and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of
religious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets,
doctrines or worship.
479 F Supp. at 1365. The Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976), provided:
Subdivision 1. Limitations. The following deductions from gross income shall be allowed in
computing net income . . .
Subd. 22. Tuition and Transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary or
secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin,
wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which
is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and
other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in
teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary
schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the
teaching of religious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such
tenets, doctrines, or worship.
452 E Supp. at 1317-1318.
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relied on identical Supreme Court cases,4 7 the district court in Rhode Island found
its statute unconstitutional while the Minnesota court found its law constitutional. ""
Interestingly, the Rhode Island court emphasized the Lemon entanglement doc-
trine and found that the deduction could not be "policed without excessive gov-
ernment entanglement, ' 49 while the Minnesota court virtually ignored the entan-
glement test.
A similar irreconcilable conflict of decisions illustrating the uncertain applica-
tion of the entanglement test involves cases determining whether religious bodies
and religiously affiliated organizations, such as church-operated schools, are ex-
empt from state unemployment compensation taxes. These differ from the tuition
deduction cases because they not only discuss whether religiously affiliated bodies
can constitutionally be exempt, but they also discuss whether religiously affiliated
bodies must be exempt. 50 Exemption is required, it is argued, because application
of unemployment compensation laws to the employees of a religiously affiliated
organization would result in considerable government interference and entangle-
ment with the religious organization. 5 1
In order to avoid the entanglement and other constitutional issues that arise
when unemployment compensation statutes apply to church-operated schools, some
courts have construed these statutes as exempting religiously affiliated schools. 2
47. Both cases cite and rely upon Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947); Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
48. 479 E Supp. at 1372; 452 E Supp. at 1322.
49. 479 F Supp. at 1372. The difference in result may be partially due to the fact that the two
courts chose dissimilar approaches to the issue-approaches that were probably suggested by the parties
in each case. The Rhode Island court, however, was aware of the arguments advanced by the Minnesota
court, as it cited the Minnesota decision, but refused to follow its holding and rejected any analogy to
Walz. See 479 E Supp. at 1370.
50. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, State of Alabama and State of Nevada at 30-43, Alabama v.
Marshall, 626 E2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980) petition for cert. filed sub nom. Marshall v. Alabama, 49 U.S.L.W
3456 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1980) (No. 80-922).
51. "In order to comply with the Secretary's decision [not to exempt religious institutions from the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act], church officials would be forced to assume extensive recordkeeping
and reporting responsibilities with regard to church and school activities. State officials would be
required to evaluate church school compliance with the regulatory scheme and to correct any perceived
deviation therefrom through elaborate enforcement powers. Moreover, in ascertaining what services at
church schools should be labeled (strictly church duties), and in conducting hearings into the propriety
of a church school employee's termination of employment, state officials indisputably would be required
to undertake religious-oriented inquiries. Petitioners submit that, under all the governing case authority,
these inevitable consequences of the Secretary's decision would constitute excessive governmental entan-
glement with religious groups, in violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and, as
applied to the states the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 30.
52. Durso & Brice, NLRB v. the Catholic Bishop of Chicago: Government Regulation Versus First Amend-
ment Religious Freedoms, 24 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 295, 325 n.137 (1980) citing the following examples of
courts striking down such taxes on religious schools: Grace Brethren Church v. California, No. CV
79-93 MRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg
Confession v. Department of Indus. Rel. of Ala., CU 78-500325 MCR (Cir. Ct. Mobile Co., Ala. 1979);
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. v. Bowling, 89 Ill. App. 3d 100, 411 N.E.2d 526 (1980); Roman
Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana Dept. of Labor, 387 So. 2d 1248 (1st
Cir. 1980); Independent Baptist Church v. Tennessee, No. 54227 (Chancery Ct., Hamilton Co., Tenn.
March 23, 1979).
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State unemployment compensation hearing officers in other states similarly have
held that the state unemployment compensation schemes for which they are re-
sponsible do not apply to parochial schools. 3 The Department of Labor rejected
such an approach with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, however, and deter-
mined that the Federal Act "was clearly intended to result in State coverage of
church-related schools.' Under this ruling, several states were held to be in
nonconformity with the Federal Act because they refused to apply the unemploy-
ment compensation tax to church-operated schools. 55 Recently the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed holdings of nonconformity,56 while the Supreme Court
of South Dakota, finding no excessive entanglement, upheld them. 7 In resolving
these conflicting opinions, the Supreme Court avoided the First Amendment issue.
Instead, it held that as a matter of statutory interpretation parochial schools which
have no legal existence apart from the church are exempt from unemployment taxes.
58
2. Cases Involving Jurisdiction of Government Agencies aver Religious Institutions. The
question of government agency jurisdiction and control over church-related institu-
tions59 is another hotly contested issue in the church-state legal arena which illus-
trates the confusion in the lower courts. Even though the Supreme Court has
53. Durso & Brice, supra note 52, citing In Matter of Christian Day Schools of Wis. Evangelical
Lutheran Synod, Appeal No. C106-L-78 (79) (Minn. Dept. of Econ. Sec. Sept. 9, 1979); Employment
Division v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 42 Or. App. 421, 600 P.2d 926 (1979); St. Lucas
Evangelical Lutheran School, No. 21875 (Wis. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Rel. 1979).
54. Letter to the Most Reverend Thomas C. Kelly, General Secretary of the United States Catholic
Conference from Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor (April 18, 1978) quoted in Independent Baptist
Church v. Tennessee, 468 E Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
55. Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, "each state's unemployment statute is reviewed
annually by the Secretary of Labor. States found to comply with the . . .FUTA are approved and
thereafter certified by the Secretary. Since only payments made into a certified state fund entitle the
payor to a reduction of FUTA liability, the state legislatures are provided strong incentive to conform
their statutes to new FUTA requirements." Comment, Bringing Christian Schools Within the Scope of the
Unemployment Compensation Laws: Statutory and Free Exercise Issues, 25 VILL. L. REV. 69, 76 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
56. See Alabama v. Marshall, 626 E2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980) petition for cert. filed sub nom, Marshall v.
Alabama, 49 U.S.L.W. 3456 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1980) (No. 80-922).
57. In the Matter of Northwestern Lutheran Academy, 290 N.W2d 845 (S.D. 1980), rev'd sub nom.
St. Martin Church v. South Dakota, 49 U.S.L.W. 4575 (U.S. May 26, 1981) (No. 80-120).
Several other courts and administrative agencies have also taken positions on this issue. For example,
a Pennsylvania state court recently held that religious schools are exempt from unemployment compen-
sation, Christian School Ass'n v. Comm., Dept. of Labor, 423 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1980), while a
federal district court in North Carolina held that these schools are covered. Ascension Lutheran Church
v. Employment Security Comm., 501 E Supp. 843 (W.D. N.C. 1980).
58. St. Martin Church v. South Dakota, 49 U.S.L.W 4575 (U.S. May 26, 1981) (No. 80-120).
59. Stating the issue in terms of government agency jurisdiction, however, may often be somewhat
misleading; since in many instances an even more fundamental question is whether the statutory
scheme the government agency is seeking to enforce may constitutionally be made applicable to
church-related institutions. For example, the question of whether the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has jurisdiction or control over church-related institutions almost always arises in
connection with the question of whether Title VII is intended to, or may constitutionally, apply to such
institutions. See Comment, Are Churches Above the Law? The Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Equal Pay Provisions of Title VII to Religious Organizations, 40 U. PITT. L, REV. 465 (1979); Comment,
King's Garden Inc. v. FCC: Loosening the Political Hands of Caesar, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 619 (1975):
Note, The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment to Title VIi's Exemption for Religious Organizations, 73
MICH L. REv. 538 (1975); text and notes at notes 64-68, infra.
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recently decided a case in this area-NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago6 0 -many of
the questions pertaining to the jurisdiction of government agencies remain.
Cases involving jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 6 1
over religiously affiliated organizations where Congress has expressly intended
such jurisdiction 62 are prime candidates for entanglement evaluation. To date,
however, the NLRB has ignored claims of potential impermissible entanglement
resulting from its jurisdiction. For example in asserting its jurisdiction over a
health care institution operated by the Seventh Day Adventists, the NLRB refused
even to consider the First Amendment arguments raised by the Adventists, saying
that First Amendment issues were for court resolution. 63 Similarly, it has ignored
First Amendment arguments opposing its jurisdiction over hospitals and social
service groups owned and operated by the Roman Catholic Church.6 4 Because of
the NLRB's previous non-treatment of First Amendment issues, at least one fed-
eral court of appeals has ordered the NLRB to address its jurisdiction "in light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Catholic Bishop"65 whenever its asserted jurisdiction
raises First Amendment objections. The NLRB's purported "past insensitivity to
first amendment concerns and . . . lack of ability to deal with first amendment
60. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Catholic Bishop of Chicago case involved the refusal of Catholic schools
in Chicago and in Indiana to bargain collectively with associations of lay teachers employed at various
seminaries and diocesan high schools. After the associations were certified as the exclusive representa-
tives of the faculties at the schools and the schools continued their refusal to bargain, the associations
filed unfair labor practices charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB found
the Catholic dioceses that operated the schools to be in violation of federal law for refusing to bargain
with certified bargaining representatives. The NLRB's decision was challenged by the diocese and was
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that NLRB jurisdiction over the schools in
question violated the religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's result, but on different grounds: the Court found no Congressional intention to grant
NLRB jurisdiction over church-operated schools and therefore, refused to construe the National Labor
Relations Act to provide for jurisdiction over such schools. By construing the Act as not providing for
jurisdiction, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the "difficult and sensitive questions arising out
of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses." 440 U.S. at 507. Although the Court
avoided the First Amendment questions, the clear implication is that were the Court to have considered
the matter it would have found the NLRB's action unconstitutional. See Note, General Laws, Neutral
Principles, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REV. 149, 161-62 (1980).
The narrowness of the Court's holding in Catholic Bishop of Chicago does not allow the case to shed
much light on the entanglement test or the test's application to future cases involving regulatory
schemes and church-related institutions. In fact, the decision does not even provide guidance on other
jurisdictional powers claimed by the NLRB that are subject to challenge under the First Amendment. In
Mid-American Health Services, Inc., 103 L.R.R.M. 1234 (1980), the NLRB's asserted jurisdiction over a
health care institution operated by the Seventh Day Adventists, for example, was found not to fall within
the Catholic Bishop of Chicago decision because "a clearly manifested congressional intent to grant NLRB
jurisdiction" was found. Durso & Brice, supra note 52, at 314 & n. 84.
61. The NLRB was created and given authority under the Connery-Wagner Labor Relations Act of
1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
62. Expressed Congressional intention to grant NLRB jurisdiction is necessary to bring any case
beyond the threshold question and holding of Catholic Bishop of Chicago. See note 60, supra.
63. Mid-American Health Services, Inc., 103 L.R.R.M. 1234, 1235 (1980).
64. See Bon Secours Hospital Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (March 4, 1980); Catholic Community
Services, 247 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (Feb. 1, 1980).
65. St. Elizabeth Community Hospital v. NLRB, 626 E2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1980). For a summary
of the Catholic Bishop decision, see note 60, supra.
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issues, ' 66 will undoubtedly result in an increasingly large number of federal court
challenges to asserted NLRB jurisdiction.
The application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 6 7 and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations to religious institutions also illus-
trates the uncertain and unsettled use of the entanglement test. While one court
has held that the EEOC has jurisdiction to rectify alleged sex discrimination
involving an unmarried, pregnant teacher at a Roman Catholic high school,6"
another has held that the EEOC does not even have jurisdiction to investigate or
issue subpoenas to gather information with respect to alleged employment discrim-
ination involving a female professor at a Baptist college." Similarly, one federal
district court has held that the EEOC can exercise jurisdiction over allegations of
employment discrimination against a Seventh Day Adventist publishing affiliate,
70
while another court has held that any attempt by the EEOC to enforce any portion
of Title VII against a Baptist seminary would violate the First Amendment. 7i This
confusing array of precedents can provide little, if any, assistance to a court
considering the application of Title VII or EEOC regulations to a religious institu-
tion.
III
TOWARD A USEFUL ENTANGLEMENT TEST
A. Bases for the Test
It is both interesting and revealing to note that since the Supreme Court's
announcement of the entanglement doctrine in Walz and Lemon, the Court has
ignored the doctrine in deciding numerous First Amendment religion clause cases,7 2
including cases concerning state aid to parochial school students, 3 church property
disputes, 4 nonpublic school tuition reimbursements and tuition tax credits, 75 and
the application of compulsory school attendance laws to a long-standing, religiously-
66. Durso & Brice, supra note 52, at 314.
67. The Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against any individual, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
68. Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
69. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 451 F Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1978). The decision was subsequently
vacated, however, by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the EEOC could investigate sex
or race discrimination by religious institutions but not discrimination based on religion. 626 E2d 477
(5th Cir. 1980).
70. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 E Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
71. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 485 E Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
72. The Court did use the entanglement doctrine in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), in which
it upheld the use of state bonds to finance a building which the state would convey to a Baptist College
after the Baptist College had repaid the bonds.
73. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
74. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
75. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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based tradition of in-home education. 76 The Court's treatment of the entanglement
doctrine clearly shows that the doctrine cannot, and indeed should not, be the only
test or basis available for deciding a First Amendment religion clause case. Like
most other legal theories, the entanglement doctrine has limited applicability. The
test may be important in some cases but useless in others. Thus, the challenge
becomes not only formulating and applying an effective entanglement test but
determining the cases in which the test is useful.
As a beginning, the entanglement test obviously is for difficult cases. Some
forms of government action so clearly establish or inhibit religion that courts can
strike them down without close scrutiny; one does not need a microscope to see an
elephant. Surely it takes no lengthy examination of facts and theories to find that
legal inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs7 or state interference with
a church's internal dispute over religious doctrine, in the form of civil adjudica-
tion, 78 directs and influences religious activity. The entanglement test is useless
when government action so obviously directs or interferes with religious activities.
On the other hand, many church-state contacts do not obviously establish or
inhibit religion. A time release program for religious study79 or a government
study of the costs of private schools8 0 are examples of church-state relationships
that require some contact but do not obviously establish or inhibit religion. Further-
more, anytime government regulates religious institutions some entanglement arises;
even fire codes and building or zoning regulations create some church-state con-
tacts. No one would argue that all such contacts are impermissible under the First
Amendment. A properly formulated entanglement test should analyze and distin-
guish what the Supreme Court has called "necessary and permissible contacts"
from contacts that give rise to "excessive entanglement."8l
Aside from its usefulness in deciding difficult Establishment Clause cases, the
entanglement test is also particularly helpful in Free Exercise clause cases. Al-
though the test originated in Establishment Clause cases, 82 it probably applies even
more forcefully to the Free Exercise clause, because government contact often
inhibits religion rather than establishes it. The test's usefulness in Free Exercise
clause questions arises because, as the Court noted in Walz, it primarily responds
to the First Amendment prohibition of both "governmental evaluation" of religious
practices 83 and "extensive state investigation into church operation and finances."84
Moreover, as the Lemon Court explained, "[t]he objective is to prevent, as far as
76. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
78. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
79. See Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 E Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1978).
80. See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 E2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) rev'g 460 F Supp. 121 (D.PR.
1978).
81. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
82. Both Walz v. Tax Commission and Lemon v. Kurtzman were decided under the Establishment
Clause.
83. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
84. Id., at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other."8 5
These explanations verify that the entanglement test becomes most useful in cases
involving either government investigation or government regulation of religious
institutions which might infringe upon the free exercise of religion. Establishment
Clause ramifications remain under the entanglement doctrine, however, because
contacts that inhibit or interfere with the programs and policies of religious institu-
tions may really direct religious activity into governmentally selected channels.
B. Factors in a Proposed Entanglement Test
An effective and useful entanglement test should first determine whether the
activity that the government contacts touch upon is religious or nonreligious. Only
when the activity is religious does entanglement become a concern. If the activity is
religious, the courts must evaluate the frequency and the effect of the contacts to
determine whether they direct or influence religious matters. Those that do not
direct or influence religious matters are neutral and may be permitted. If the
contacts direct or influence religious matters, the courts must review the nature of
the government interest in creating the contacts to determine whether the govern-
ment has a compelling interest that justifies the contacts.
1. The Nature of the Religious Activity. Religious institutions engage in a wide
variety of activities ranging from obviously religious liturgical celebrations and
education of clergy to the performance of otherwise nonreligious tasks, such as
sponsoring an athletic league or selling books, which may nonetheless be religiously
motivated and inspired. This wide variety of activities tempts one to analyze
religious activities and institutions based on the degree of religiosity and to argue
that the more religious the activity, the more protected it becomes. But such an
approach is fatally flawed: for just as courts in the free speech context are unable to
define a continuum of speech and must therefore categorize activities as "speech,"
"speech plus" and "conduct, '8 6 it is often impossible in the religious context to
define a continuum of religious activity and to place the activity in question
correctly on the continuum. The real key to an effective entanglement test, like the
First Amendment speech tests generally, should depend less on calibrating the
degree of religiosity than on distinguishing religious from nonreligious activity.
Therefore, under an entanglement test, courts first should determine whether
an activity is "religious" or "nonreligious." In making such a determination, they
should acknowledge that they may not be in the best position to classify activities as
"religious" or "nonreligious"; the institutions themselves are in the best position to
advance and support an assertion of religiosity or nonreligiosity 8 7 The institutions
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
86. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (affixing peace symbol to flag is speech);
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands as a war protest is
speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card is conduct); Teamsters Local
695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing is speech plus).
87. The Supreme Court's most recent decision in the First Amendment religion clause area,
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have overwhelming incentives to assert their status accurately since classification as
religious or nonreligious will impact upon numerous aspects of their operation,
including government support, subsidies, regulation, tax status, and so on. Also,
some activities may be religious for one denomination, but not religious for anoth-
er, as validly held religious beliefs will differ from group to group. 88 Therefore,
courts need not establish rigid rules and distinctions in an attempt to classify
activities. For the purposes of applying the entanglement doctrine, the assertion by
a religious institution that the activity in question is religious in character ordinarily
should suffice. There are existing legal tools to deal with spurious assertions and
asserted religious practices that conflict with public health and safety. 89 To force full
litigation in every case would burden both the parties and the judicial system
unnecessarily, and would lead to artificial and rigid classifications of "religious" and
"nonreligious" activity.
There will, of course, be ambiguous and fuzzy areas near the border of the
religious-nonreligious distinction, just as there are in the speech-conduct distinc-
tion.90 Especially difficult are cases involving activities that are religious in some
situations but nonreligious in others. For example, although a church may operate
a hospital or social service agency as a religious activity, others can conduct such
operations as nonreligious activities or even for profit. Courts should treat cases
Thomas v. Review Board, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981), emphasizes that the issue of what is "religious" does
"not turn upon judicial perception" of asserted religious beliefs or practices:
The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often than not a difficult
and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests. However, the resolu-
tion of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or
practice in question: religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensi-
ble to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.
101 S. Ct. at 1430 (footnote omitted).
88. In Thomas v. Review Board, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held
that the Indiana Supreme Court had erred in denying unemployment benefits to a worker, Eddie
Thomas, who quit his job for religious reasons. Thomas was originally working in a roll foundry but
when the foundry was closed, he was transferred to a department that produced turrets for military
tanks. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, objected, on religious grounds, to participation in the production
of military weapons and machinery. With the closing of the roll foundry, however, Thomas' employer no
longer had any departments that were not engaged directly in the production of military weapons.
Thomas quit and applied for unemployment benefits. The Indiana Supreme Court denied unemploy-
ment benefits to Thomas, relying in part on the fact that there were other Jehovah's Witnesses working
at the plant that did not find the work objectionable. The United States Supreme Court rejected such
an approach and noted that validly held religious beliefs will differ even among persons within the same
religious organization. "[T]he judicial process," the Chief Justice argued, "is singularly ill equipped to
resolve such differences .. " 101 S. Ct. at 1431. If the courts must recognize that validly held religious
beliefs will differ among individuals within the same religious organization, then a fortiori the courts
cannot dispute that validly held religious beliefs will differ from organization to organization.
89. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). The law can also
deal with spurious claims and practices that conflict with public health and safety. See e.g., Town v. State
ex rel. Reno, 377 S.2d 648 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 48 (1980).
90. Close cases can prove to be most difficult. Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966)
(demonstration is speech) and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (demonstration held
to be "an exercise of... basic constitutional [First Amendment] rights in their most pristine and classic
form") with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (demonstration is speech plus) and Adderly v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration is conduct).
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where it is unclear if an activity is religious or nonreligious protectively, just as they
do in the fuzzy cases in the speech-conduct area. Thus, borderline activities
deserve protection because it is better to err in favor of First Amendment rights
than to err in favor of encroachment on such rights.9'
2. The Frequency and Effect of the Contacts. Only after determining that the
activity in question is religious should courts consider the frequency and effect of
the contacts. If the activity is not religious, the frequency and effect of the contacts
is irrelevant because there can be no entanglement.
To determine whether the contacts direct or influence religion, courts must
look at how the contacts will affect the religious organization. It could be argued
that any contacts that cause the organization to do something it would not other-
wise have done impermissibly direct and influence religious matters. But almost
any contact would cause the organization to alter its conduct. Even relatively
neutral contacts such as fire inspections would also change the organization's
behavior, as in the case where an organization might be required to buy new
electrical wiring for the church. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a government contact
that would not, in some fashion, alter the behavior of an organization. Such
changes in behavior, by themselves, are not the subject of First Amendment
scrutiny.
Instead, courts should focus on whether the change in the organizations behav-
ior affects its religious beliefs or practices. Fire inspections usually do not affect
religious beliefs or practices, because unsafe electrical wiring (even in a church) is
not ordinarily a part of an organizations religious concerns. But an EEOC re-
quirement that a Catholic school retain an unmarried pregnant teacher surely
interferes with religion. In such a situation, the government is requiring a religious
group to keep a person in a role model position who has obviously violated the
group's belief against premarital sex. This is the kind of contact that directs or
influences religious activities.
Some contacts will appear to be neutral but will not be neutral in effect because
of frequent or regular occurrences. One inspection of a church's employment
records will probably not affect religious belief or practice. But regular inspections
or audits of a religious institution's financial or employment records with no
apparent direction would produce "a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship"
that would significantly interfere with "the desired insulation and separation 92 of
church and state. Such regular inspections would cause churches (or any other
employer) to adjust their inspected records and their financial and employment
practices themselves, to suit the inspector's biases. Depending on the specific target
of the investigations, they may affect religious doctrine and practice. Churches may
cease hiring those who can best further the churches' religious beliefs, and instead
91. See e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
92. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 675 (1970).
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hire those whom the inspectors favor. The repetitive character of the contacts
ultimately changes the religious practices of the group.
But frequency alone is, again, not determinative. For example, the numerous
contacts between church and state leaders necessary for the formulation of plans to
provide security and crowd control during a visit of a prominent church official
will probably have no effect on religious activity,93 but one single civil adjudication
of a church doctrinal controversy will profoundly alter the religious activities of at
least one party to the controversy. 94 Thus, both the frequency and the effect of
church-state contacts must be simultaneously considered.
Virtually all of the reported lower court cases could have benefited from a
consideration of the frequency and effect of contacts. Extensive and regular gov-
ernment investigations into church finances or church activities through inspection
of church documents, records and publications, for example, create a large num-
ber of contacts that necessarily cause the religious institutions to change their
practices to conform more to the wishes of the inspector than the wishes of the
religion. 9 5 Application of NLRB regulations to religious institutions creates a large
number of contacts, 96 which may or may not impermissibly direct or influence
religious activity, depending on the activity involved.9 EEOC regulation of religious
institutions also creates many contacts which might not be neutral. 98 The applica-
tion of state unemployment taxation schemes to religious institutions will create
different kinds of contacts -depending on the nature of the scheme. If the scheme
only requires a payment of a tax, then it creates few, relatively neutral contacts,
although taxation creates more contacts than does exemption.9 9 If the scheme
involves a determination of whether a discharge was justified and requires em-
ployment reinstatement, then it generates more instances of potentially non-
neutral contacts since it is dictating employment practices.100
93. But see Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 79-2786 (Slip Opinion, 3d Cir. Dec. 30, 1980).
94. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
95. See United States v. Holmes, 614 F2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,
604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'g 460 E Supp. 121 (D.P.R. 1978).
96. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 E2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), affd on other grounds
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
97. For example, asserted NLRB jurisdication over unionization and collective bargaining by semi-
nary teachers at a church seminary would probably be more likely to direct or influence religious affairs
than would NLRB jurisdiction over unionization and collective bargaining by the physical plant person-
nel at the same seminary.
98. Neutrality will often depend upon the nature of the religious institution. Compare EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 485 E Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (application
of EEOC regulations to a seminary) with EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 E Supp. 1291 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (application of EEOC regulations to a church affiliated publishing corporation).
99. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
100. Under some state statutes, "the state unemployment boards are required to oversee and
intervene in the day-to-day operations of the [parochial] schools." Comment, supra note 55, at 116. This
intervention is in the form of determining "what percentage of employment is 'secular' and covered by
the law, versus what portion is excluded as being sufficiently 'religious,"' and in determining "whether
the decision to fire or leave was justified under the 'good cause' standard." Id., at 116, 117 (footnotes
omitted).
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3. The Governmental Interest Served. If the activity that the government touches
is religious and the contacts direct or influence religious activity, then the courts
must examine the government interest served in creating the contacts. This exami-
nation is unnecessary if the activity is nonreligious, because then entanglement is
not a concern. It is also unnecessary if the contacts do not direct or influence
religious activities, because then the contacts are neutral. In either event, the
government interest is not relevant because such contacts are permissible. But the
presence of religious activity plus impact from the state contact requires courts to
review the government interest.
An effective entanglement test must consider the importance of the government
interest being served in the particular church-state entanglement."" This is espe-
cially true because of the diversity of today's range of government activity and
interests. They include everything from national defense and public safety to the
conversion of football to meterball. Although the distinctions are hard to make,
some governmental interests are surely more important than others. Thus, the
government's interest in public safety might prevail over the asserted religious
activity of using poisonous smoke at religious services;i 0 2 but the government's
interest in regulating and monitoring labor disputes among teachers in seminaries
might have to yield to the religious organization's right to "establish [its] own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and government."'1
0 3
Two Supreme Court decisions under the Free Exercise Clause illustrate the
process of identifying the government interest in specific church-state relationships.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 4 members of the Old Order Amish religion challenged
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance laws, arguing that such laws inhibited the
practice of their long-held religious tradition of in-home education. The Supreme
Court held that Wisconsin could compel school attendance only if the compulsion
did "not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there
is a state of interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."' 05 According to the Court, the state
interest in compulsory education stemmed from a desire to help students become
self-sufficient and to prepare citizens for meaningful participation in the state and
community. The Court found these interests valid, but insufficiently compelling to
justify the encroachment on the claimants' free exercise of religious beliefs. 10 6
In Sherbert v. Verner,10 7 the Supreme Court similarly analyzed the government
101. Explicit consideration of whether state action is prompted by a compelling government
interest is not new to the Religion Clauses, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-34 (1972), nor to
the First Amendment speech and press clauses, see text and notes at notes 104-106, infra.
102. See Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 48 (1980) (use
of cannabis as part of religious service enjoined).
103. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976). See Catholic
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 E2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), afjd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
105. Id., at 214.
106. Id., at 224-25, 228-29.
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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interest in a South Carolina unemployment compensation scheme. Sherbert had
been denied unemployment compensation because she refused, on religious grounds,
to accept employment that required her to work on Saturday. The Court found
that there was no "compelling state interest" that justified the burden placed on the
free exercise of religion in such a disqualification.
Weighing the government interest to determine whether the church-state con-
tacts are permissible is a long-established, well-accepted practice in First Amend-
ment litigation. The Supreme Court, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., recently
reaffirmed the long-recognized priniciple that the government may encroach upon
the fundamental protection of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment only to
protect the most compelling of government interests. 108 This case is just one link in
a long line of cases holding that any time the government seeks to limit or abridge
First Amendment freedoms by statute, it must construct the statute narrowly to
reflect only the compelling government interest. " ' 9
The entanglement test should expressly incorporate the weighing of the gov-
ernment interest, because the weighing allows a sliding standard. A compelling
government interest may justify some contacts, while the absence of a compelling
government interest should prohibit contacts that direct or influence religious
activities.
C. Remedies
Impermissible church-state contacts demand remedies. Prohibiting the contacts
or the relationship giving rise to them is the most obvious remedy. But complex
relationships, especially those created by general regulatory schemes, necessitate a
range of remedies to deal with widely varying situations. The range of possible
remedies should include (1) prohibiting the relationship altogether, (2) permitting
the relationship and dealing with the contacts on a case-by-case basis, and (3)
altering an aspect of the relationship to circumscribe or neutralize the contacts.
1. Prohibiting the Relationships. Currently, prohibition of a given church-state
relationship is the most frequently invoked remedy for violations of the entangle-
ment doctrine and, indeed, under all other First Amendment religion clause
doctrines. The Supreme Court applied this remedy in Lemon v. Kurtzman and in
108. 433 U.S. 97 (1979).
109. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Whether or not a compelling
government interest will justify a departure from "the desired isolation and separation," see Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), of church and state depends upon several factors, including,
whether, on the whole, the government interest can be protected without interfering with the separation
of church and state. The burden is on the government to show that there are no less entangling
alternatives available to protect the government interests. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66-67
(1960) (Harlan, J., concurring); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-105 (1940); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 917-18 (1970); Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
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several subsequent decisions. 1 0 Lemon involved two different state statutes: a Rhode
Island statute that paid salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in
nonpublic elementary schools, and a Pennsylvania statute that reimbursed nonpublic
schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials in specified
secular subjects. The Supreme Court held that "the cumulative impact of the
entire relationship arising under the statutes . . . involves excessive entanglement
between government and religion," and prohibited the contacts in toto by nullifying
each statute in its entirety."
2. Permitting the Relationship and Dealing with Contacts on a Case-by-Case Basis. It
may not always be possible-or desirable-to prohibit completely contacts that
constitute "excessive entanglement" under the entanglement test. In fact, some
contacts will be permissible in some situations but will be overreaching and imper-
missible in other situations.' 12 As to these contacts, the logical remedy is to permit
the relationship giving rise to the contacts but to limit or proscribe the contacts, as
necessary, on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court's treatment of church property disputes illustrates the
efficacy of generally allowing a particular church-state relationship but proscribing
the overreaching contacts that arise in individual situations. The law allows civil
courts to adjudicate such disputes but prohibits them from doing so when the
adjudication requires them to resolve religious issues. For example, Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich' 3 involved a dispute over control of a diocese in the
Serbian Orthodox Church that ultimately led to the Church's defrockment of a
bishop. The defrocked bishop sued in a state court to have himself declared the
true bishop of the diocese and to enjoin the new bishop from interfering with
Church assets. While the Supreme Court accepted the general proposition that civil
courts can resolve church property disputes, it nonetheless declared that "where
resolution of the [church] disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity.' 14 The Court thus distinguished
between "disputes over church property as such, and . . . religious disputes that
only 'incidentally' affect church property or other secular matters"' 15 and held that
110. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
111. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614, 625 (1971). This same approach was also taken by
the Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 E2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
112. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), as discussed in text
and notes at notes 113-116, infra, is a good example of such a situation.
113. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
114. Id., at 709. See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); TRIBE, supra, note 7, § 14-12 at 877-78.
115. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-12 at 879, citing 426 U.S. at 709, 720-23.
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the Illinois Supreme Court had erred by intermeddling with the church's "internal
discipline and government."' 16
3. Circumscribing or Neutralizing the Contacts. Depending on the frequency
and nature of the contacts, courts can restructure the contacts in order to neutral-
ize their adverse effect. If total neutralization is impossible, restructuring may
nonetheless minimize the negative and restrictive effect of the contacts.
A recent Court of Appeals decision, United States v. Holmes,' 17 shows the useful-
ness and practicality of this remedy. In that case, the bishop and director of a
church appealed a summons the IRS issued in order to establish the church's
entitlement to tax exempt status. The summons asked the church to give the IRS
"all documents relating to the organizational structure of the church since its
inception; all correspondence files for the [relevant] period .. . ; the minutes of all
meetings of the officers, directors, trustees or ministers, during this same interval;
and a sample of every piece of literature pertaining to the Church."' 18 The court
had little difficulty in finding that the summons was "too far-reaching" and vacated
a district court's enforcement order.'' 9 While the tax exemption provided under the
Internal Revenue Code for religious organizations 120 necessarily creates some church-
state contacts in the assessment of the validity of a particular church's exemption,
the determination does not require the examination and review of every church
document, record, and publication. The remedy of restructuring entangling church-
state contacts, such as those resulting from the broad summons at issue in United
States v. Holmes, is essential to our system of government where some contacts are
permissible and necessary but others are not.
IV
THE LOWER COURT CASES REVISITED:
APPLYING THE REFORMULATED TEST
In the application of the proposed entanglement test to the cases that follow, a
caveat must be repeated. The entanglement test does not purport to address every
possible First Amendment issue. Many church-state relationships, such as the school
aid package in Lemon, for example, must also be evaluated in terms of whether
they "advance religion" or have a "secular purpose."' 2 1 Furthermore, even though a
particular church-state relationship contains no entanglement problems, it may
nonetheless raise other First Amendment issues. The analysis here ignores all but
the entanglement issues.
The question of NLRB jurisdiction over religious institutions illustrates the use
of the proposed entanglement test. Under the proposed test, one must first deter-
116. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
117. 614 E2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
118. Id., at 988.
119. Id.
120. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
121. See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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mine whether the activity over which the NLRB is claiming jurisdiction is religious.
This depends, in part, upon whether the religious organization properly considers
and claims it to be religious. If the activity is religious, then the relationship
created by NLRB jurisdiction should be reviewed to determine whether it directs
or influences religion.
The National Labor Relations Act' 22 imposes a wide range of duties on the
institutions under NLRB jurisdiction and empowers the NLRB to determine whether
the institutions have properly discharged those duties.' 2 3 For example, there are
established procedures for the selection of union representatives and standards
governing collective bargaining. 24 The Board has broad powers to investigate all
aspects of the employment relationship to determine if these requirements have
been fulfilled and will adjudicate alleged violations and other unfair labor practic-
es. 125 Not only does the Board carry on its functions through formal proceedings,
but it also directs and influences labor relations through the daily interplay of the
Board agent, union representatives, and the employer. The relationship between
the NLRB and the institutions subject to its jurisdiction thus touches on, and tends
to direct, every aspect of the employment relationship.
These numerous and far-reaching contacts necessarily result in a "continuing
day-to-day relationship"'1 6 between the NLRB and the religious institution. As a
result of NLRB jurisdiction, the religious institutions would have to change their
labor practices to accord with the voluminous NLRB rules and procedures. A
religiously affiliated school, for example, could no longer deal with its employees in
light of its religious message. Instead it would have to follow the rules and proce-
dures developed by the NLRB, even though religious beliefs played no part in their
development. Not only would the religious institution's procedures be changed, but
the NLRB procedures are also likely to control the institution's personnel decisions.
Instead of being able to promote a person on the basis of a strong religious
orientation, the institution may find that as a result of the "good faith bargaining"
procedures mandated by the NLRB, it could only promote those with the most
seniority. By affecting a religious organization's employment procedures and deci-
sions, the NLRB would interfere with the institution's religious practices and goals.
Since NLRB jurisdiction directs and influences religion, it is only permissible if
supported by a compelling government interest which overcomes the religious
organization's right to establish and govern its own religious practices. Here the
government's interest is based on a desire to minimize labor disputes in order to
insure the free flow of commerce. The religious organization's interest is based on
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion. If the government's
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). The Act, as enacted, was originally entitled the Connery-Wagner
Labor Relations Act of 1935.
123. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-161. See also Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 E2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1977), affid on other grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
124. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-161. Institutions under NLRB jurisdiction must also comply with an ever
increasing body of law embodied in regulations and court decisions.
125. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-161.
126. Walx v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
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interest prevails, the organization will not be able to exercise its religious beliefs
freely. However, if the religious organization prevails, commerce will still continue.
When this major loss of First Amendment rights is weighed against such a slight
infringement, if any, upon commerce, the First Amendment rights must prevail.
Because NLRB jurisdiction results in a large number of inherently non-neutral
contacts and because these contacts lack a compelling government interest, the
fundamental question in the NLRB cases is whether the activity that would be
subject to NLRB jurisdiction is religious. If the activity is religious, only prohibition
of NLRB jurisdiction avoids entanglement because there is no method of restruc-
turing the contacts to avoid interference with religious matters. If the activity is
non-religious, then no entanglement arises.
EEOC jurisdiction over religious institutions and the application of Title VII to
such institutions are similar, yet more troublesome, problems. Title VII specifically
exempts every "religious corporation, association, educational institution or soci-
ety."'1 27 But courts are confused as to the meaning and application of this exemp-
tion, with some courts all but ignoring the exemption in applying Title VII to
religious institutions. 128 It could be argued that under the Catholic Bishop of Chicago
reasoning,"2 9 courts should not apply Title VII to religious institutions because of
the "absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring" religious institu-
tions under Title VII coverage.i30 But assuming, as most courts have, that Congress
intended Title VII, as presently codified, to apply to religious institutions, then the
proposed entanglement test can effectively analyze such an application.
EEOC jurisdiction over religious institutions creates both permissible and
inpermissible contacts. For example, a religious institution violates the equal pay
provisions of the Civil Rights Acts when it has male and female clerks or laborers
doing substantially the same type and quantity of work, but does not provide equal
salaries. EEOC enforcement of the equal pay provisions in such a situation proba-
bly does not involve a religious activity and therefore creates little risk of influencing
religious matters. On the other hand, EEOC investigation into the propriety of
discharging religious employees, such as parochial school teachers, for violating
church doctrines and standards more clearly involves religious issues.
The crucial question to be asked in Title VII cases, therefore, is whether the
activity in question is religious. If the activity is religious, EEOC regulation of it will
direct and influence the religion. When a district court holds that the dismissal of
an unmarried pregnant parochial school teacher is sex discrimination,"' for exam-
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. The exemption, in its entirety reads, "This subchapter shall not apply to
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
128. Most courts have read the exemption to allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis
of religion, but not allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis of sex or national origin. See
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 E Supp.
266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
129. See note 60 supra.
130. See note 60 supra.
131. The fact that parochial school teachers are involved in religious activity is beyond any serious
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pie, the state is essentially determining either that the religious doctrines and
standards regarding morality are erroneous, 132 or that the state, not the church,
must be the source of such doctrines and standards. Both of these determinations
are prohibited by the First Amendment. 133 Similarly, EEOC or Title VII regulation
of the employment of ministers' 34 or seminary teachers' 3 5 by a church clearly
interferes with the religion. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "an
investigation and review of such matters of church administration and government
as a minister's salary, his place of assignment, and his duty, which involve a person
at the heart of any religious organization, could only produce by its coercive effect
the very opposite of that separation of Church and State contemplated by the First
Amendment."' 13 6 Courts cannot allow Title VII regulation of these employment
relationships because the state may not regulate internal church administration and
government. 137
Because the Title VII church-state contacts will touch religion in some situa-
tions, but avoid it in others, courts should allow the contacts generally, but they
should review and circumscribe them, as necessary, on a case-by-case basis to
ensure that they do not touch upon religious matters. The case-by-case review must
prohibit Title VII regulation that touches upon religious doctrine or interferes with
church administration and government.' 38 The proposed entanglement test can
also be evaluated by applying it to the issue, recently considered by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, of whether participation by religious institutions in job
training and employment programs under the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA)i39 constitutes excessive entanglement. 1 0
Those challenging the program argued that when the government scrutinized
CETA financing to insure that CETA funds were actually spent on government
doubt. The Supreme Court has held that "parochial schools involve substantial religious activity and
purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). The Court has repeatedly found that such
schools are substantially religious, see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975), and pervasively
sectarian, see Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
132. But see Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 E Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
133. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1979); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
134. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 E2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
135. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 22 FEP 141, 485 E Supp. 255 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
136. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 E2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
137. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708, 724 (1976) ("The
fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that is rests upon an impermissible
rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the
issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions. ... "
"[Tlhe First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their
own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government .. "); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
E2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) ("[Tihe application of . . . Title VII to the
employment relationship existing between . . . a church and its minister would result in an encroach-
ment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.")
138. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
139. Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839 as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-524 (1978).
140. Decker v. O'Donnell, No. 80-1230 (Slip Opinion 7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
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programs and not diverted to other activities, excessive entanglement resulted. But
this argument assumes that government scrutiny, by itself, constitutes excessive
entanglement and ignores the nature of the activity that is the object of the
scrutiny. Since participation by church-affiliated organizations in CETA or other
social welfare programs involves government activity, and not religious activity, one
never gets beyond the first factor in the proposed test. Job training by religious
institutions under CETA is not a religious activity because the institutions are
simply carrying out forms of government activity. CETA is a governmentally defined
and sponsored program that does not involve religious activity. By its very nature,
it is "free from religious content" and is "strictly non-sectarian in nature."
'' 4 1
Thus, any amount of auditing or scrutiny of the spending of government funds
by religious institutions on CETA or other government programs does not consti-
tute excessive entanglement because religious activity is not involved. Of course,
the case would be different if the government aided and then audited religious
programs rather than used religious institutions to carry out government pro-
grams. The line between these two scenarios is admittedly fine, but CETA seems
quite clearly to fall on the "government activity" side of the line.
V
CONCLUSION
History and experience teach us that in spite of the First Amendment's objec-
tive "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the
precincts of the other," "[slome relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable."' 4 2 An effective entanglement test, therefore, must dis-
tinguish so-called "necessary and permissible contacts" from "excessive entangle-
ment." ' 4 3 Simply looking at the sheer quantity and quality of contacts is ineffectual
because not all contacts direct or influence religious activity and compelling gov-
ernment interests might justify even those that do.
We propose an entanglement test that will direct courts to the functional issues
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. The test expressly incorporates
established First Amendment doctrines, such as the distinctions between "protect-
ed" and "unprotected" activities and the requirement that a government interest be
141. Department of Labor Field memorandum No. 450-79 (Sept. 17, 1979). In this context, it is
interesting to note that Justice Douglas, one of the staunchest opponents of aid to parochial schools,
suggested that "[tihe government may, of course, finance a hospital though it is run by a religious order,
provided it is open to people of all races and creeds .... The government itself could enter the hospital
business; and it would, of course, make no difference if its agents who ran the hospitals were Catholics,
Methodists, agnostics, or whatnot. For the hospital is not indulging in religious instruction or guidance
or indoctrination." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 633 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation
omitted). But see Decker v. United States Dept. of Labor, 473 E Supp. 770 (E.D. Wis. 1979), modified,
485 F Supp. 837 (E.D. Wis. 1980), affd sub nom. Decker v. O'Donnell, no. 80-1230 (Slip Opinion 7th
Cir. Sept. 9, 1980), wherein it was held that the use of CETA funds to employ and train various staff
members at sectarian schools in Wisconsin led to excessive government entanglement with religion and
was, therefore, violative of the First Amendment.
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
143. Id.
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"compelling" in order to justify even the slightest encroachment on First Amend-
ment protections. The proposed test first asks whether the activity involved in the
contacts is religious. If the activity is religious, it examines the frequency and
character of the contacts to determine whether the contacts direct or influence
religious activity. Contacts that do not direct or influence religious activity are
neutral and may be permitted. If the contacts direct or influence religious activity,
it examines the government interest served by the contacts. Only where there is a
compelling government interest are such contacts permissible.
This factor analysis should identify church-state contacts that support or inter-
fere with religious activities and institutions in such a way as to direct or influence
religious matters. Such contacts require either complete prohibition or prohibition
on a case-by-case basis or restructuring. Conversely, the test will also identify
neutral contacts, those that do not direct or influence religious activities, and
contacts that do not touch upon religious activities at all. Truly limited and neutral
contacts of this sort are "necessary and permissible contacts"'14 4 and are not prohib-
ited by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax Commission, recognized that "[sleparation
[of church and state] .. .cannot mean absence of all contact; the complexities of
modern life inevitably produce some contact. .... 5 But even with this reality in
mind, "the objective" of the First Amendment nonetheless remains "to prevent, as
far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the
other."14 6 We believe that the entanglement test as announced in Walz and Lemon,
and as applied by the courts, has failed to set a standard by which permissible and
impermissible contacts may be distinguished. It is hoped that the test proposed
here will advance the development of such a standard.
144. Id.
145. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 644, 676 (1970).
146. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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